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A B S T R A C T
This paper provides a review and synthesis of past research
regarding financial disclosure management by nongovernmental
nonprofit organizations and suggests directions for future study. The
primary purpose of this review is to summarize the evidence on
financial disclosure management to help regulators and other
stakeholders understand why, how, and to what extent nonprofits
engage in this behavior. The paper begins by defining disclosure
management in nonprofit organizations and exploring the motiva-
tions for why it might occur. Next is a survey of the nongovern-
mental nonprofit financial reporting environment: objectives,
common practices, and the informational needs of users of nonprofit
financial reports. Research exploring the motives, methods, and
consequences of disclosure management is summarized. The
evidence suggests that nongovernmental nonprofit managers have
a variety of incentives to manage reported numbers and that they do
in fact alter spending decisions, choose accounting methods, and
design cost allocations to achieve certain performance benchmarks.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we review the scholarly research on financial disclosure management in the
nonprofit sector.1 Recent financial scandals involving public charities, such as the National Capital
Area United Way and the Red Cross, have shaken the public’s confidence in public charities and
have resulted in serious decreases in donations to those organizations (Dimsdale, 2009; Rucker,
2007). These scandals have also shed light on the unique financial reporting environment of
nonprofit entities and how it creates incentives and opportunities for financial disclosure
management, which in turn can lead to a misallocation of charitable donations and a failure to
optimize philanthropic output. The primary purpose of this review is to summarize the
evidence on financial disclosure management to help regulators and other stakeholders
understand why, how, and to what extent nonprofits engage in this behavior. Furthermore,
the review sheds light on the consequences of disclosure management and what can or should be
done to limit it.
There is a large stream of research examining earnings management in the for-profit sector,
where managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter
financial reports either to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). However, nonprofit entities differ from profit entities in ways that can
affect reporting incentives and constraints. The objective of nonprofit management is not the
maximization of shareholder wealth as it is for the typical profit-seeking firm. Nonprofits serve a
different set of stakeholders and measure economic performance somewhat differently.
Nonetheless, research shows that nonprofits, like for-profit firms, have both motives and
opportunities to misreport financial information in order to mislead stakeholders or influence
contractual outcomes. Since nonprofit organizations do not focus on earnings or profits as such,
we use the more general term ‘‘financial disclosure management’’ or simply ‘‘disclosure
management’’ rather than ‘‘earnings management’’ to describe the opportunistic use of financial
reporting and real-transaction management to affect stakeholders’ perceptions of firm
performance.
The nonprofit sector is an important and rapidly growing part of the United States economy. In
2008, the most recent year for which there is data, nonprofits that report to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) accounted for approximately $1.9 trillion in revenue and $4.3 trillion in assets (Wing,
Roeger, & Pollak, 2010).2 Nonprofits enrich our lives through art and culture and provide many goods
and services that the government might otherwise be called upon to fund. Charitable giving can be
thought of as a form of voluntary wealth redistribution and is considered very much part of the
American way of life. Most estimates place the percentage of American households that make
monetary contributions each year at 70–80 percent, and the average American household contributes
more than $1000 annually (Brooks, 2008). If nonprofit organizations manage their financial
disclosures to mislead stakeholders, then allocation of resources to and within this sector of the
economy may be suboptimal.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
underpinnings for the study of financial disclosure management: information asymmetry, the
agency problem, and the nonprofit objective function. The nonprofit financial reporting
environment and the role of charity watchdog groups as financial information intermediaries
are discussed next, to show how the unique characteristics of the nonprofit environment create1 Accounting research on nonprofit entities focuses on either governmental or nongovernmental units.
Our review is limited in scope to nongovernmental units. While federal, state and local governments and their agencies are
broadly considered to be part of the nonprofit sector, the financial, regulatory and reporting environments in which they
operate set them apart as a separate field of research. In particular, governments and their agencies are created by a political
process, are often funded by tax money (and often have the ability to increase revenues by raising taxes), do not typically
conduct fundraising, seldom receive donations, and are subject to different forms of governance, regulation, and reporting
requirements. They do not request tax exemption from the IRS, and they do not report to the IRS via Form 990.
2 These numerical facts do not include small nonprofits with gross receipts less than $25,000 or religious congregations,
which are exempt from reporting requirements.
unique motives and opportunities for financial disclosure management. Section 3 discusses
the building blocks of disclosure management research: data sources and statistical and
econometric methodologies. Sections 4–6 review the findings of studies that test for and analyze
misreporting or disclosure management.3 Section 4 reviews research related to donations-
market and contracting motivations for disclosure management, while Section 5 reviews research
related to regulatory motivations—disclosure management to minimize political costs and
taxes.4 Section 6 discusses what research has shown to be the consequences of financial
disclosure management in the nonprofit sector as well as what can be done to mitigate the
problem. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the state of the research to date and suggests avenues for
future study.
2. Theoretical underpinnings
2.1. Information asymmetry, agency costs, and the nonprofit objective function
The primary roles for accounting information, valuation, and stewardship (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, &
Walther, 2010) are as applicable in the nonprofit sector as in the for-profit sector. Potential donors
want to know that nonprofits will be able to use their contributions in meaningful, effective, and
efficient ways, and creditors want to be able to assess credit risk and return (Parsons, 2003).
Managers likely possess more information about the organizations’ financial condition and
mission-related program service opportunities than outsiders. This information asymmetry
creates a demand for financial reporting and an opportunity for financial disclosure management.
Information asymmetry is greater in nonprofits than in corporations because there are, in
effect, two principals: the donor and the beneficiary of the nonprofit’s goods and services
(Kitching, 2009). The donor may provide capital, but other parties are the beneficiaries of the net
earnings from that capital. To look at it another way, the donor purchases a benefit such as
humanitarian aid, while third-party beneficiaries actually receive the product or service paid
for. In many cases, the donor has limited knowledge of the needs or preferences of the
beneficiary. Information asymmetry in the nonprofit sector is exacerbated by the fact that not all
stakeholders have access to the same quantity or quality of financial information, as discussed in
Section 2.2.
Donors and creditors experience agency problems with managers of nonprofits similar to those
faced by stockholders of public corporations, because resource providers do not have full decision-
making rights, and because management does not fully bear the financial risk or the wealth effects of
its decisions (Core, Guay, & Verdi, 2006; Fama & Jensen, 1983a). In the nonprofit world, this agency
problem is usually dealt with by utilizing a self-perpetuating board of trustees (Fama & Jensen, 1983b),
whose primary purpose is to direct executive activities on behalf of the stakeholders (Aggarwal, Evans,
& Nanda, 2012). The board of trustees uses accounting information (among other types of information)
to monitor the stewardship of management. Implicit and explicit contracts with creditors, managers,
and other resource providers also incorporate accounting information. Because of the potential for
nonprofits to abuse their tax-exempt status or to channel donated funds to the benefit of insiders,
federal and state regulatory agencies demand accounting information from nonprofit organizations
(Desai & Yetman, 2005). Thus, information asymmetry, agency problems, contracting, governance,
and regulation all create demand for ex-post accounting information and provide motives and
opportunities for financial disclosure management.
There is a substantial body of literature dealing with the motives for and the methods of earnings
management by publicly traded corporations, but due to differences in the way nonprofits are
financed and governed, one cannot assume that those motivations or methods would be applicable to3 The papers included in this review cover a time period of about 25 years. However, due to the many changes in reporting
standards and data availability in the recent past, the focus is primarily on the more recent studies as they are likely to be the
most relevant going forward.
4 Political costs refer to the costs of additional regulation, including higher taxes, borne by large or high-profile firms (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986). Nonprofits are exempt from tax on their program-related activities but are taxed on business activities
that are unrelated to their mission. Private non-operating foundations are also subject to taxes on undistributed income.
the nonprofit sector.5 Fama and Jensen (1983b) posit that the nonprofit form of organization
dominates endeavors that are funded by donations because the absence of residual equity holders
assures donors that contributed funds will not be diverted to such claimants.6 The important feature of
the nonprofit form of organization is not that nonprofits cannot or do not make a profit but that there
are no alienable claims to profits (or to net assets). A corollary to that observation is that since donors
do not require a financial return on investment, the organization can provide the desired goods or
services at a lower cost.
Further, the distinction between for-profit and nonprofit organizations goes beyond the absence of
residual claims to the very nature of relationships between inputs and outputs. Profit-seeking firms
use capital from equity holders and creditors to provide the factors of production and incur expenses
to produce a product or service that is sold to customers. As a general rule, expenses are incurred for
the purpose of increasing revenues or profits. In the nonprofit organization, the distinction between
revenue and contributed capital is not so clear, and the linkage between expenses and revenues can
differ. Nonprofits, or at least those financed primarily by donations, receive resources from donors to
provide goods and services to beneficiaries. Rather than incurring expenses to generate revenues,
many charitable nonprofits receive revenues (although they may incur some fundraising expenses to
do so) to incur program service expenses. Profit maximization is irrelevant. In fact, several researchers
suggest there are political costs associated with showing a profit: a surplus of revenues over expenses
implies that the nonprofit is not fulfilling its charitable mission (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Leone & Van
Horn, 2005).
So what is the goal of the nonprofit firm? Steinberg (1986) posits that nonprofits at one extreme
seek to maximize gross resources (revenues) and at the opposite extreme seek to maximize the
residual available for charitable service (which implies simultaneous maximization of revenues and
program service expenditures and minimization of fundraising and administrative expenses). He
refers to the first group as budget maximizers and the second as service maximizers. Most of the
research to date relating to financial disclosure management in the nonprofit sector seems to assume
the latter objective is the prevalent one or at least the one that donors would endorse, but results from
empirical tests of objective functions are mixed.7 Jegers (2010) defines the agency problem existing
between the board of trustees and nonprofit management as the disparity between objective
functions; the board’s goal is service maximization, while the manager’s goal is budget maximization.
If the objective is to maximize revenues, then managers will have incentives to manage financial
disclosures in such a way as to encourage more donations. If the objective is to maximize funds
expended on program services, then management may wish to disclose information that makes it
appear that they have been successful in doing so, especially if their compensation is tied in any way to
donations or program spending.5 The studies cited in this note are simply examples drawn from a large body of literature. Healy and Wahlen (1999) and
Stolowy and Breton (2004) provide comprehensive reviews of earnings management research. Studies have documented
evidence that corporations manage earnings to reduce political or regulatory costs or increase regulatory benefits (e.g., Han and
Wang, 1998), to increase earnings-based compensation (e.g., Guidry, Leone, & Rock, 1999), to avoid violation of debt covenants
(e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), to meet analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Kasznik, 1999), to avoid small losses or earnings decreases
(e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), to inflate earnings prior to equity offerings (e.g., Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998), or to
minimize taxes (Lopez, Regier, & Lee, 1998). Researchers have also examined a variety of methods firms use to accomplish
earnings management, including management of accruals such as allowance for bad debts, deferred, and other valuation
accounts or reserves (e.g., Beaver, McNichols, & Nelson, 2003; Phillips, Pincus, Rego, & Wan, 2004); and the manipulation of real
activities such as price discounts, overproduction, and reduction of discretionary expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006) and even
the strategic timing of charitable contributions to corporate foundations (Petrovits, 2006).
6 To qualify for federal tax-exemption, IRC Section 501(c) requires that no part of the net earnings of a nonprofit organization
may inure to the benefit of any shareholder or any individual having a personal and/or private interest in the activities of the
organization.
7 Steinberg (1986) finds that healthcare nonprofits in his sample are budget maximizers, while welfare, education, and arts
firms are service maximizers. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) estimate the fundraising elasticity of donations for a sample of
nonprofits filing Form 990 tax returns for the four years 1973–1976 and find that it is not significantly different from zero in all
seven industry segments considered. They conclude from this that ‘‘nonprofit firms are not maximizers of net expenditures on
output’’ (service maximizers); however, ‘‘they may be maximizers of total expenditures’’ (budget maximizers). In contrast,
Posnett and Sandler (1989) find that their sample of U.K. charities ‘‘maximize the surplus available for expenditure on charitable
output,’’ which makes them service maximizers.
Fig. 1. Nonprofit stakeholders.Fig. 1 summarizes the relationship between the nonprofit organization and its various
stakeholders.
2.2. The nonprofit financial reporting environment
Standards for financial reporting by nongovernmental, nonprofit entities are set by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In 1993, the FASB revised its standards for nonprofits in an effort
to enhance the usefulness of the disclosures and to provide greater uniformity in financial reporting.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 117 requires three financial statements: the Statement
of Financial Position (a balance sheet), the Statement of Activities (a statement of revenues and
expenses), and a Statement of Cash Flows (FASB, 1993). Expenses are reported by function and
classified as either program services or supporting services on the Statement of Activities.
Additionally, voluntary health and welfare organizations (VHWO) must prepare a Statement of
Functional Expenses, which presents expenses by object class, or type of expense, within the program
services and supporting services categories. These statements are designed to help resource providers
make assessments concerning how well the nonprofit performed, how well it can continue to provide
services, and how well management has discharged its stewardship (Khumawala & Gordon, 1997).
Surprisingly, there is no mechanism to ensure that the audited financial statements of nonprofit
organizations are made available to potential users. Nonprofit organizations are not legally required to
provide such statements to anyone but certain government agencies.8 Unlike publicly traded
corporations, nonprofit corporations are not regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
but rather by the IRS (Simon, Dale, & Chisolm, 2007). A nonprofit must obtain tax exemption from the
IRS by filing a registration statement. If a nonprofit organization qualifies for exemption under Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(3), then it is also authorized to receive tax-deductible
contributions. Most nonprofits are subject to annual filing of IRS Form 990, an informational tax
return, and charitable nonprofits must complete a Statement of Functional Expenses.9 The IRS Form
990 also includes schedules for reconciling total revenues and expenses shown on the tax return with
amounts shown on audited financial statements, for disclosing compensation paid to officers and
directors, and for analyzing the organization’s sources of revenue. Form 990 tax returns have been
subject to public disclosure since 1996, and in recent years the disclosure requirements have
expanded.
Thus, for charitable nonprofits, the principal, regulated annual disclosure of financial information is
IRS Form 990, not audited financial statements (Keating & Frumkin, 2003). The quantity and quality of
information provided on Form 990 (available to outsiders) may not be the same as that provided on
the audited financial statements (often available only to insiders, the Board of Trustees, and some state
regulatory agencies) (Kitching, 2009). The fact that different user groups have access to different
financial reports exacerbates the difficulty of researching financial-disclosure management. Should
researchers be more concerned with the numbers reported on Form 990 or the audited financial
statements? Does evidence of disclosure management based on analysis of IRS Form 990 filings imply
that the audited financial statements are also biased? Comparisons of disclosures found on the IRS
Form 990 with those made in audited financial statements (Krishnan, Yetman, & Yetman, 2006) or in
annual reports to state regulatory agencies (Keating, Parsons, & Roberts, 2008; Krishnan & Yetman,
2011) reveal significant differences in the amounts of program service, administrative, or fundraising
expenses reported.
While institutional donors and large individual donors may request a copy of a nonprofit’s Form
990 or audited financial statements, the average individual donor may not know what information is
available, how to obtain the information, or how to read and interpret financial statements (Keating &
Frumkin, 2003). Several independent agencies have emerged in the recent past to act as information
intermediaries for the charitable nonprofit sector. GuideStar, the Council of Better Business Bureaus’
Wise Giving Alliance (CBBB), and Charity Navigator, for example, maintain websites where the public
can access financial information about nonprofits, including copies of recent Forms 990. These
organizations also publish standards and rate nonprofits on a number of measures of organizational
efficiency and capacity. CBBB standards require, for example, that charities devote at least 65 percent
of annual expenses to program activities. Charity Navigator’s ratings are based on measures such as
percentage of total expenses that are administrative, fundraising costs per $1 contributed, growth in
revenues and expenses, working capital, and so forth. A recent study finds that contributions are
positively associated with these ratings and with changes in these ratings (Gordon, Knock, & Neely,
2009).
2.3. Financial performance measurement and motives for disclosure management
In the Statement of Functional Expenses on IRS Form 990, as in the Statement of Activities required
under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), all of the expenses of the organization are
classified as either program service, administrative, or fundraising. Program services are those
activities that relate to the organization’s exempt purpose. The ratio of program service expenses to
total expenses—referred to as the program service ratio, program spending ratio, or simply as the
program ratio—reflects the portion of an exempt organization’s expenses that are devoted to fulfilling8 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 2007) requires stringent audits of nonprofits that expend $500,000 or more of
federal financial assistance in a fiscal year. Twenty-five states require audited financial statements to be filed along with, or in
lieu of, a Form 990. See Kitching (2009, p. 512); and Desai and Yetman (2005, pp. 11–12).
9 Nonprofits with gross receipts less than $25,000, as well as churches and other religious organizations, are exempt from the
Form 990 reporting requirements.
its exempt mission and is widely used as a measure of efficiency (Barrett, 1999; Smith, 1993). A
number of empirical studies have found that donations are positively associated with the program
ratio or negatively associated with its inverse, price (Buchheit & Parsons, 2006; Callen, 1994; Gordon
et al., 2009; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Posnett & Sandler, 1989; Thornton & Belski, 2010; Tinkelman,
1998, 1999; Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986).
Other measures of efficiency identified by researchers include the fundraising ratio used by
CBBB (fundraising expenses as a percentage of total donations received), or administrative
expenses as a percentage of total expenses (Greenlee & Brown, 1999). In each case, the higher the
proportion of funds used for expenses other than program services, the less efficient the
organization is judged to be. Donors appear to be more willing to give to charities that spend a
larger proportion of their revenues on activities that further the charities’ missions (and a smaller
proportion of their revenues on administrative or fundraising activities), and managers behave as
if they feel pressure to optimize these ratios. A majority of nonprofit executives believe that
outsiders use IRS Form 990 to monitor the organization’s efficiency and that it is important to keep
administrative costs low to attract and retain funding (Parsons, Pryor, & Roberts, 2012). Thus,
nonprofit managers have incentives to maximize program expenses or minimize fundraising and
administrative expenses, thereby encouraging more donations by favorably impressing donors,
grant-makers, and ratings agencies.
Contracts with lenders may specify certain debt thresholds or other covenants designed to protect
the creditor, and managers may have incentives to misreport related amounts in order to qualify for
better credit ratings or obtain credit at a lower cost (Press & Weintrop, 1990). Models designed to be
used by managers, board members, donors, suppliers, and other resource providers to assess the
financial vulnerability of nonprofit firms employ financial indicators that use amounts disclosed on
IRS Form 990 (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Baber, Daniel, and Roberts (2002)
find evidence that nonprofit managers’ compensation is positively associated with program spending,
suggesting that nonprofit managers may stand to benefit directly from increases in the program ratio.
This compounds the incentive for misreporting amounts spent on program services.
The reporting practices of publicly traded for-profit corporations, nonprofit charities, and
noncharitable nonprofits, along with potential motivations for financial disclosure management, are
summarized for comparison purposes in Table 1.
3. The building blocks
3.1. Sources of data
Because it is subject to public disclosure (at least since 1996), Form 990 is a ready source of data for
research regarding financial reporting by nonprofits. The IRS’s Statistics of Income (SOI) division
makes digitized data for a stratified sample of Forms 990 and 990-EZ available for download from its
website. The sample includes IRC Section 501(c)(3) organizations and Section 501(c)(4)–(9)
organizations. Sampling rates range from 1 percent for small-asset classes to 100 percent for
large-asset classes. These microdata records contain balance sheet and income statement line items,
as well as weights (to estimate the population), for each organization. The IRS Form 990-T, filed by
nonprofits with unrelated business income, was not subject to public inspection until passage of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, which mandates that any Form 990-T filed by a 501(c)(3) organization
after August 17, 2006, is a public document. The IRS’s SOI division is not currently making Form 990-T
data available on its website, but individual nonprofit organizations must make copies available to
anyone who makes a request. Yetman, Yetman, and Badertscher (2009) compare disclosures on IRS
Forms 990 and 990-T and discuss the relative reliability of such disclosures.
The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), a project of the Center on Nonprofits and
Philanthropy (CNP) at the Urban Institute, makes a variety of data available for research purposes.10
Much of NCCS’s data is received from the IRS after processing, resulting in a time lag of several years.10 See the ‘‘Guide to Using NCCS Data’’ at http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/kbfiles/468/NCCS-data-guide-2006c.pdf for a
description of the types and sources of data available.
Table 1
Comparison of reporting practices and motivations for financial disclosure management.
Type of entity Report Legally required
distribution
Common voluntary
distribution
Motivation for financial disclosure
management
Publicly traded
for-profit
corporation
Audited financial
statements (GAAP)
 SEC
 Shareholders
 General public
(on request)
 Stock analysts
 Internet
 Smooth earnings
 Avoid earnings decreases or losses
 Meet analysts’ forecasts
 Avoid violating debt covenants
 Maximize managerial compensation
Tax return  IRS  Minimize tax liability
Nonprofit
charity
Audited financial
statements (GAAP)
 Certain state
departments of
revenue
 Grant-making
agencies
 Major donors
 Charity watch-dog
groups
 Internet
 Protect tax-exempt status
 Meet grant criteria
 Avoid political costs
 Attract donations
 Improve watchdog ratings
 Enhance managerial/firm reputation
 Increase managerial compensation
 Minimize tax on unrelated business
activity
 Minimize taxes on undistributed
income and net investment income
(private non-operating foundations)
Tax returns (IRS
Forms 990, 990-T,
and 990-PF)
 IRS
 General public
(on request)
 Major donors
 Charity watch-dog
groups
 Internet
Non-charitable
nonprofit
Audited financial
statements and
IRS Form 990
 Certain state
departments of
revenue
 Members
 Internet
 Enhance managerial reputation
 Increase managerial compensation
 Meet state regulatory standards
Tax returns (IRS
Forms 990, 990-T,
and 990-PF)
 IRS
 General public
(on request)
 Minimize tax on unrelated business
activityNCCS’s Digitized Dataset, compiled from scanned Forms 990 from 1998 to 2003, contains a number of
line items not included in IRS data; the NCCS Core Files begin with 2004 and continue to 2006.
GuideStar also receives data from the IRS. In fact, it receives the most recent raw data as soon as they
become available. Because GuideStar must process the data itself, it charges a higher fee than does
NCCS (Yetman & Yetman, 2011).
Another federal government source of data is the Office of Management and Budget Federal Audit
Clearinghouse (http://harvester.census.gov/sac/), which provides audit information for organizations
that receive federal grant money and undergo a ‘‘single audit’’ per OMB Circular A-133 (OMB, 2007).
Gordon, Greenlee, and Nitterhouse (1999) discuss nonprofit financial data availability and some of the
irregularities and limitations associated with some of the data sources. Some of their discussion may
be outdated at this point because of many recent changes. Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak (2000) and
Fischer, Gordon, and Kraut (2002) compare IRS Form 990 data to audited financial statement data and
discuss reliability issues and reporting differences.
Many of the papers included in this review use IRS or NCCS data. Although these data sources are
easily accessible and inexpensive, information with enough detail to analyze cost allocations and
accruals is generally not available. Some researchers are able to obtain data from federal, state, or
industry regulatory agencies or from investment analyst databases. A number of researchers find that
state regulatory agencies, such as the State of California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (OSHPD), are richer sources of data that include far more detail, with costs broken down
into categories, sometimes even at the departmental level.
3.2. Statistical and econometric methods
One of the challenges of studying financial disclosure management is that it can seldom be directly
observed. The researcher must infer that numbers are being manipulated or misreported when they
vary from amounts reported elsewhere or from amounts predicted by a model. Two of the
methodologies most commonly employed in the study of earnings management in the for-profit
sector that have subsequently been adapted and applied to the nonprofit sector are distributional
analyses and discretionary accruals models. A distributional analysis (as in Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997)
examines the distribution of a given accounting measure, such as operating income or return on assets,
usually by plotting a histogram. The theory is that absent disclosure management, the distribution
around zero, for example, should be smooth. If there is a discontinuity—an unexpectedly small number of
firms reporting incomes just below zero, for example, combined with an unexpectedly large number of
observations with incomes just above zero—this is taken as evidence of disclosure management.
Discretionary accruals models, sometimes referred to as Jones models, as in Jones (1991) and
Dechow and Dichev (2002), attempt to estimate what an appropriate level of (nondiscretionary)
accruals should be by regressing a measure of accruals against its lagged value, a measure of the level
of activity, and other variables that would influence accruals. Residuals from the estimation model are
defined as discretionary accruals, and they are typically used as the dependent variable in further
regressions that attempt to find an association between discretionary accruals and managerial
incentives for disclosure management. The validity of these techniques in for-profit research has been
criticized—there are problems such as sample selection bias, measurement error, and induced
correlations, to name a few (Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010;
Durtschi & Easton, 2005; McNichols, 2000, 2002)—but the basic methodologies have been improved in
more recent years to avoid most of those pitfalls. In nonprofit research small sample sizes, data
irregularities, and heterogeneous populations may work to lessen the validity of such methods.
The Jones-type model must be adapted for use in nonprofit research, due to differing objective
functions and managerial incentives, as discussed in Section 2.1, as well as different accounting
methods. Rather than focusing on accruals, nonprofit researchers often attempt to estimate expected
program ratios (Baber et al., 2002; Trussel, 2003), levels of charity care (Vansant, 2011), or fundraising
or administrative expenses (Yetman & Yetman, 2011), then use the residuals from these prediction
models as their measure of misreporting. The primary difficulty lies in assembling an appropriate cast
of independent variables. Trussel (2003), for example, uses a model similar to that used by Baber,
Roberts, and Visvanathan (2001) and estimates a normal program ratio by regressing the actual
program ratio (program service expenditures divided by total expenses) on size, two fundraising
ratios (professional fundraising fees divided by total expenses, total fundraising expenses divided by
total contributions) and dummy variables for ‘‘industry’’ (arts, education, human services, etc.) for a
large and somewhat diverse group of nonprofits.
There are several weaknesses inherent in these prediction models. First, there may be a certain
amount of induced correlation when both the dependent variable and one of the independent
variables is scaled by the same measurement, such as total expenses.11 Second, most of the variables
and their components are interrelated in complicated ways: revenues, contributions, program
expenses, total expenses; this may result in a certain amount of endogeneity or simultaneity bias
(Greene, 1997, pp. 712–714). Third, it is likely that omitted factors such as managerial dedication;
ability to utilize donated supplies, services, and volunteer labor; and ability to identify and pursue
program opportunities are more influential on the program ratio than firm size or fundraising, but
such variables are impossible to measure and difficult to proxy. As a result, the models can suffer from
omitted variable bias or from proxy or measurement error (Greene, 1997, pp. 435–444). Last, the data
being used to estimate the expected program ratio is data that has possibly already been managed
(later research shows that fundraising amounts, for example, are frequently misreported (Krishnan
et al., 2006)), which can also result in measurement error.
It is shortsighted, therefore, to assume that a large prediction error from a Jones-type prediction
model is necessarily an indication of disclosure management. Even if the prediction model is well
specified, there is always the possibility that unique firm characteristics or unique financial or11 Several researchers have pointed out that due to the dual impact of fundraising (increasing donations while decreasing the
program ratio) it is necessary to include both the program ratio and fundraising expenses in the model to capture both effects.
But because the program ratio, administrative ratio, and fundraising ratios sum to unity, statistical problems with multi-
collinearity can result when more than one such ratio appears in the model.
economic conditions may result in numbers that vary significantly from what the model would
predict. Differences in organizational culture could account for wide variations in fundraising,
administrative, and program efficiencies that are unrelated to accounting manipulation. Furthermore,
firms that engage in disclosure management in order to report program ratios that approach average
will go undetected by prediction models based on cross-sectional averages.
Nonprofit researchers have been creative in finding other ways to identify potential disclosure
management, including comparisons of audited financial statements or financial reports prepared for
a state or industry regulatory agency with Forms 990 submitted to the IRS. Surveys, field studies,
simulations, and analytical modeling have also added to our understanding of disclosure management
issues. Table 2 summarizes recent financial disclosure management studies. The table includes
sources of data, sample sizes, and econometric methods employed as well as succinct summaries of
the major findings of each study.
4. Financial disclosure management to improve performance measures: donations market and
contracting motivations
Section 2.3 discussed incentives to manage financial disclosures in order to maximize the program
ratio or minimize the fundraising and administrative ratios to influence donations as well as
compensation and debt contracts. Is there evidence that nonprofits manage their ratios? Moreover,
how is this misreporting accomplished? Efficiency ratios are computed using the numbers reported on
IRS Form 990 or audited financial statements. When classifying expenses as program, administrative,
or fundraising (or for tax purposes, as pertaining to an exempt activity versus a taxable activity), it is
frequently necessary to allocate common or joint costs. Because many nonprofits are small, personnel
and facilities-related costs may need to be allocated among several expense classifications. There is
little guidance regarding these allocations; in fact, charities have considerable discretion in
determining how to allocate expenses among Form 990 functional categories for programs,
administration, and fundraising (GAO, 2002). Research suggests that financial disclosure management
may be accomplished through these expense allocations: firms may over-allocate expenses to
program services (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Krishnan
et al., 2006; Trussel, 2003). A related strategy to increase the program ratio (or decrease the
fundraising ratio) is to misclassify fundraising expenses as program service expenses or to misallocate
joint costs to program services (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Khumawala, Parsons, &
Gordon, 2005; Krishnan et al., 2006; Tinkelman, 2009).
4.1. Identifying potential disclosure management using performance ratios
Is it possible to identify financial disclosure management by examining performance ratios? Baber
et al. (2001), using a Jones-type prediction model, investigate large differences between predicted and
actual program spending and find at least one organization that seems to be engaging in blatant
disclosure management. Using similar methodology, Trussel (2003) finds that the likelihood of a
charity being a potential accounting manipulator—having a higher-than-expected program ratio—is
associated with a lower surplus margin, lower deferred revenues and expenses (immediate
recognition of a program expense inflates the program ratio), more depreciation allocated to programs
(faster depreciation write-offs inflate the program ratio), and bigger positive changes in the program
ratio. The classification of any nonprofit with a large prediction error as a potential manipulator seems
rather arbitrary, since it disallows the possibility that some nonprofits are exceptionally efficient (see
the discussion of Jones-type models in Section 3.2).
Bhattacharya and Tinkelman (2009) fail to find evidence of manipulation of reported ratios to just
meet (rather than just fail) CBBB standards. Their frequency distributions of reported program ratios,
fundraising ratios, and management ratios show no unusual clustering of observations close to the
cut-off levels dictated by CBBB guidelines. Krishnan and Yetman (2011) find that nonprofit hospitals in
California report an average program ratio of 77.4 percent to the state regulatory agency, compared to
86.5 percent on the Form 990, which suggests that the numbers most likely to be seen by the public are
being managed upwards.
Table 2
Summary of research on financial disclosure management in nonprofit organizations (presented in the order in which the papers appear in this review).
Authors (year) Focus of study (database) sample size Method, financial disclosure variable Summary of major findings
Panel A: research involving donations market and contracting motivations (Section 4)
Baber et al. (2001) Charitable nonprofits (hand-collected
Form 990 tax returns)
1239org/years
Jones-type model
Program ratio
Program ratio varies between revenue maximizers
and cost minimizers; firms with program ratios
higher than predicted by the model are investigated
and irregularities are found
Trussel (2003) Nonprofits (NCCS/IRS 1997–1998)
8496org/years
Jones-type model
Program ratio
A model is developed a model for identifying
potential accounting manipulators. Such firms tend
to have high program ratios, lower margins, less
deferred revenues and expenses, and more program
depreciation
Bhattacharya and
Tinkelman (2009)
Nonprofits (NCCS-GuideStar 2001)
111,000 organizations
Distributional analysis
Program, fundraising, management ratios
No unusual clustering of ratios is found at or near
CBBB-guideline cutoff points
Krishnan et al. (2006) Nonprofits reporting zero fundraising
expenses (NCCS 1998)
4995 organizations
Regression analysis
Fundraising expenses
Nonprofits inappropriately shift expenses from
fundraising to program services. Expense
misreporting is associated with compensation and
donation sensitivity to the program ratio
Keating et al. (2008) Charities reporting telemarketing to
states (state agencies, NCCS 1994–
2004)
4248 organizations
Logistic regression analysis
Fundraising (telemarketing) expenses
74 percent of nonprofit regulatory filings misreport
telemarketing expenses. A negative association is
found between certain attributes (firm size, external
monitoring, accounting expertise) and misreporting
telemarketing expenses
Jones and Roberts
(2006)
Charities that report joint costs
(Maryland Charitable Organization
Division)
708org/years
Regression analysis
Changes in joint-cost ratio and in share of joint
costs allocated to programs
Changes in the joint-cost ratio vary inversely with
changes in the direct-program ratio and with
changes in the share of joint costs allocated to
programs. Both results are consistent with joint costs
being manipulated to smooth the program ratio
Tinkelman (2009) Avon Foundation (privately obtained
data)
Field study
Allocations of joint costs
Avon allocated fundraising costs to programs in
order to meet CBBB guidelines for fundraising and
program ratios
Parsons et al. (2012) Nonprofit managers (hand-collected
survey data)
238 organizations
Survey and regression
Reporting of administrative expenses
Executives admit to managing efficiency ratios by
adjusting real transactions as well as by cost-shifting
administrative expenses. The belief that efficiency
ratios affect funding increases the likelihood of such
behavior
Panel B: research involving political cost, regulatory, and tax motivations
Chase and Coffman
(1994)
Colleges and universities (U.S. Dept. of
Education data and survey 1989)
170 institutions
OLS regression
Choice of cost or fair value accounting for
investments
Choice of accounting method for investments is
influenced by political costs and managerial
compensation contracts
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Christensen and
Mohr (1995)
Art museums (National Museum
Survey 1989)
106org
Logistic regression
Choice to capitalize permanent collection
Capitalization is negatively associated with size and
with federal government support, both measures of
political cost
Hoerger (1991) Hospitals (Healthcare Financing
Administration, AHA 1983–1988)
13,902org/years
Regression
Actual minus predicted profits
Not-for-profit hospitals experienced significantly
lower variation in profits than similar-size for-profit
hospitals during a period of large exogenous changes
in third-party reimbursement policy, suggesting that
earnings are being managed to meet a zero-profit
constraint
Mensah et al. (1994) HMOs (Healthcare Investment
Analysts’ database 1986–1989) 455
organizations
Jones-type model Accruals of incurred-but-
not-reported (IBNR) expenses
HMO managers may overstate IBNR expenses to
mitigate any adverse effects of public policy for
having above-normal earnings. Results for nonprofit
subsample are qualitatively similar to those of for-
profit HMOs
Leone and Van
Horn (2005)
Nonprofit hospitals (Van Kampen
Merritt 1990–2002)
8179org/years
Jones-type model
Discretionary spending and discretionary
accruals
Nonprofit hospitals adjust discretionary spending
(including charity care) and discretionary accruals to
minimize changes in earnings and to maintain a
small positive amount of margin
Ballantine et al.
(2007)
English NHS Trust hospitals (Laing and
Buisson 1998–2004)
1372org/years
Distributional analysis
Residual income
Jones-type model
Discretionary accruals
Highly significant discontinuity in the distribution of
residual income, with 52 percent of all observations
in the first interval above zero. Discretionary accruals
are negatively associated with non-discretionary
income
Eldenburg et al.
(2011)
Nonprofit hospitals (California OSHPD
1998–2003)
432org/years
Multivariate regressions
Changes in expenditures
Managers engage in real activity management to
meet earnings benchmarks (zero-profit constraint)
via both expenditure manipulation and asset
management. Managers also manage income
upward to increase compensation. Most real activity
earnings management involves non-operating and
non-revenue-generating activities
Krishnan and Yetman
(2011)
Not-for-profit hospitals (California
OSHPD and IRS 1989–2005)
620org/years
Regression
Differences in program ratios between OSHPD
and IRS reports
Normative institutional pressures (rural, church-
related, charity, or system hospitals) are associated
with higher cost-shifting, while regulative
institutional pressures (high proportion of Medicare/
Medicaid revenue) reduce the extent of cost-shifting
Eldenburg and
Vines (2004)
Not-for-profit hospitals (Florida Agency
for Health Care Admin. 1989–1991)
98 organizations
Regression
Change in bad debts expense
Hospitals in a better cash position are more likely to
reclassify bad debts as charity care (but no evidence
that hospitals with low levels of charity care
reclassify bad debts to charity care). High cash, low–
operating-margin hospitals are most likely to
reclassify
Vansant (2011) Not-for-profit hospitals (California
OSHPD 2002–2008)
1063org/years
Jones-type models
Discretionary accruals
Unexpected charity care
Managers make more income-increasing accruals
when charity care is higher than expected and
manage positive earnings toward zero more
aggressively when charity care is below expectations
Cordes and Weisbrod
(1998)
Nonprofits (IRS data 1990–1993)
9104 observations
Regressions
UBI, performance ratios, compensation
expense
Nonprofits in high-tax states are more likely to have
UBI. Nonprofits with UBI have lower management
ratios. Increases in UBI do not increase total
compensation costs but increase compensation
allocated to the taxable activities
Sansing (1998) Nonprofits with unrelated business
activities
Analytical model
Expenses of unrelated business activities
If exempt organizations are permitted to allocate
common costs to taxable activities in excess of
economic marginal costs, UBIT will fail to deter
economically inefficient investments by nonprofits
Yetman (2001) 501(c)(3) nonprofits (hand collected
data 1995–1997)
1824org/years
Regression
Allocation of expenses to unrelated business
activities
Firms over-allocate expenses to taxable activities to
reduce taxable profits
Omer and Yetman
(2003)
501(c)(3) nonprofits (hand collected
data 1995–1997)
1367org/years
Distributional analysis
Reported profitability of taxable activities
An abnormally large number of firms report near-
zero profits on their taxable activities
Hofmann (2007) Trade associations (survey, IRS 1994–
1997)
399org/years
Regression
Allocation of expenses to unrelated business
activities
Firms over-allocate expenses to taxable activities to
reduce taxable profits
Omer and Yetman
(2007)
501(c)(3) nonprofits (hand-collected
data 1994–1998)
1667org/years
Regression
Allocation of expenses to unrelated business
activities
Nonprofits’ misreporting of expenses is increasing in
tax rates, tax-return complexity, and accounting
flexibility and decreasing in detection risk
Yoder et al. (2011) Private foundations (IRS/NCCS 1994–
2006)
23,688org/years
Logistic regression
Failing or barely meeting benchmark for
taxation
Foundations use tax-motivated allocations to barely
qualify for reduced tax rates on undistributed
income
Panel C: research involving consequences and remedies
Buchheit and Parsons
(2006)
Potential donors (college students)
157 participants
Laboratory experiment
Choice to donate
Only 39 percent of subjects asked for financial
information to assist with the donation decision; 89
percent of those viewing such information donated
to the organization with the highest program ratio
Parsons (2007) Potential donors
8022 fundraising letters, 238 business
students
Field and laboratory experiments
Likelihood of donating
Donors who have previously donated are more likely
to respond to an appeal that includes financial
accounting information. Nonfinancial information
(SEA) can enhance donor perceptions
Khumawala et al.
(2005)
Joint cost disclosures (preparers, expert
donors, students)
125 participants
Experiment
Joint cost allocations
Choice to donate
Participants appear to ignore the effects of allocated
joint costs on program ratios. Little evidence that
joint cost disclosures are used to adjust reported
fundraising/program expenses
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Yetman and Yetman
(2013)
Donor reactions to disclosure
management (NCCS/IRS 1982–2007)
37,349org/years
Regression
Private donations
Donors discount program ratios of organizations
reporting zero fundraising, especially after Form 990
became publicly available. Sophisticated donors also
discount program ratios when fundraising or
administrative expenses appear to be understated
Thornton and Belski
(2010)
Reporting quality (NCCS 1998–2002)
352,812org/years
Regression
Direct support
Firms with higher reporting quality (professional
accountant, single audit, indirect support, SOP 98-2
compliant) are associated with increases in
donations
Grein and Tate (2011) Public housing authorities (HUD 2001–
2007)
19,569org/years
Univariate and regression analysis
Auditor adjustments
Auditors make significant material adjustments to
financial statements, consistent with reducing
managerial bias to meet HUD performance criteria
Yetman and Yetman
(2011)
Governance mechanisms (NCCS/IRS
1992–2006 GuideStar 2008)
Regressions, Jones-type models
Program expense accuracy
Governance mechanisms (independent directors,
audits, donor restrictions, state regulation, SOX-style
policies, etc.) are positively associated with the
accuracy of reported program expenses
4.2. Disclosure management by misreporting non-program expenses
A nonprofit can increase the amount of program services it reports by misclassifying fundraising or
administrative expenses as program service expenditures, simultaneously improving the program
ratio and the fundraising or management ratio. Seventy-five percent of the 111,000 Forms 990 filed in
2001 included in the NCCS Core database report either zero fundraising or zero administrative
expenses (Bhattacharya & Tinkelman, 2009). A close look at the websites for a sample of such
nonprofits reveals evidence of fundraising activities that would incur reportable fundraising expenses
(for example, solicitation materials or fundraising personnel) (Krishnan et al., 2006). Comparisons of
audited financial statements with matching Forms 990 also find significant differences in reported
fundraising expense amounts—38 percent of the nonprofits in one study report less fundraising
expense on their IRS Form 990 than in their audited statements (Krishnan et al., 2006). Likewise, a
comparison of telemarketers’ campaign reports filed with state regulatory agencies to the associated
amounts reported by nonprofits on their IRS Forms 990 finds that 74 percent of the Forms 990 fail to
properly report telemarketing expenses, with the result that the fundraising ratio could be
understated by as much as 15 percent (Keating et al., 2008).12
4.3. Misallocation of joint costs
Charities frequently combine fundraising efforts with other activities (e.g., a cancer research charity
might include an educational brochure about recognizing the signs of skin cancer with the charity’s
annual fundraising appeal). Such combinations are referred to as joint activities. Generally, the costs of
joint activities are reported as fundraising expenses under the supporting services category. However,
the FASB (2009) has allowed such costs to be allocated among specific program and supporting service
functions.13 From an auditing standpoint, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
has wrestled with this issue for decades—its Statement of Position (SOP) 87-2 (AICPA, 1987) included
guidance for joint cost allocations, but there was concern that the standard failed to provide auditors
with objectives for evaluating the reasonableness of allocations (Capin & Tanenbaum, 1998; Tishlias,
1992). To report any of the costs as program expenses, the AICPA’s SOP 98-2 (AICPA, 1998) requires that a
joint activity must meet three criteria as defined in the SOP: purpose, audience, and content. The
standard, however, neither prescribes nor prohibits specific allocation methods. Thus, the allocation of
joint costs still provides an opportunity for nonprofits to manage reported program expenses.
Several studies have found compelling evidence that nonprofits manage the allocation of joint
costs in order to achieve certain performance benchmarks (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Tinkelman, 2009).
Of course, it is not always possible to determine whether changes observed in the amount or allocation
of joint costs result from real, strategic changes in public education and fundraising activities or from
accounting changes in the classification or allocation of joint costs. Only about two percent of
nonprofits report joint costs (Krishnan et al., 2006), so any sample studied will necessarily be small
and biased toward larger organizations.
4.4. Misreporting administrative expenses
Another way to improve the program ratio is to forgo administrative or fundraising expenses.
While most of the studies that test for disclosure management have focused on misreporting or12 Nonprofits can misreport telemarketing in one of three ways: they can report proceeds from the campaign net of the fees
paid to the telemarketer, rather than gross proceeds with an offsetting expense elsewhere on the return; or report the
telemarketing expenses on a line other than ‘‘professional fundraising;’’ or allocate some or all of the telemarketing fees to a
classification other than fundraising.
13 FASB, Accounting Standards Codification, section 958-720-45 (FASB, 2009). Costs of joint activities may be allocated among
functions (fundraising, program, management and general) as appropriate provided all three of the following criteria are met.
(1) The activity requires specific action by the audience that helps accomplish the organization’s mission. (2) The activity’s
audience is not selected on its ability or likelihood to make contributions. (3) The activity motivates the audience to take specific
actions, beyond making contributions, that helps accomplish the organization’s mission. If one of the criteria is not met, then all
joint activity costs, except costs of exchange transactions that directly benefit donors, must be reported as fundraising expenses.
misallocating fundraising expenses, one recent study (Parsons et al., 2012) looks at motivations for
and incidence of misreporting administrative expenses. While cost-cutting is not disclosure
management per se, cost-cutting that improves ratios in the short run but negatively affects the
long-run viability of the nonprofit is not in the best interest of the stakeholders. Parsons et al. (2012) is
the first study to ask nonprofit managers whether they have or would be willing to manage efficiency
ratios or alter spending decisions in order to meet targets. Thirty-five percent of managers admit to
altering spending for administrative items such as hiring or training staff and upgrading computer
hardware or software. Twenty percent admit to having altered cost allocations to meet target ratios,
and 35 percent indicate they use their current allocation method specifically to meet target efficiency
ratios. When facing a hypothetical situation where program spending at year-end is less than
expected, at least half of the respondents indicated that they would be ‘‘very likely’’ or ‘‘somewhat
likely’’ to accelerate program spending, forgo administrative or fundraising spending, or revise
expense allocations.
Managers express greater likelihood to engage in disclosure management when they have
incentives to do so—a belief that they are being evaluated on their efficiency ratios or that they will
lose contribution or grant money if their administrative ratio is too high (Parsons et al., 2012).
Managers also indicate greater likelihood of managing efficiency ratios in the future if they have
admitted to doing so in the past. The Parsons et al. (2012) study is, of course, subject to the limitations
of survey research: low response rate with its potential for sample selection bias, inability to ensure
that the questions were answered truthfully and by the appropriate party, uncertainty as to whether
expressed intentions in a hypothetical situation correspond to actual behavior, etc. However, the
survey responses leave little doubt that some nonprofit executives feel pressure to meet financial
benchmarks and are willing to do (or at least to consider) what it takes to protect their funding (or
their jobs), including altering spending decisions and changing cost allocations.
5. Disclosure management to minimize reported wealth or profits: political cost, regulatory and
tax motivations
Regulation and taxation also create incentives for financial disclosure management. Nonprofit
hospitals are monitored by state regulators interested in assuring that the hospital is maintaining
its eligibility for tax exemption and is providing a sufficient level of charity care (Kane, 2007). A
sudden increase in profits or in the program ratio of any charitable organization may raise the
suspicion of watchdog groups or state or federal regulators (Jones & Roberts, 2006). Grein and Tate
(2011) find that public housing authorities, which are subject to monitoring by the federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), have incentives to manage financial
disclosures to qualify for less intense oversight. Nonprofits engaging in taxable activities have an
incentive to manipulate cost allocations in order to minimize tax liabilities (Jegers, 2010; Sansing,
1998; Yoder, Addy, & McAllister, 2011).14 If government and industry regulators are considered
stakeholders or users of financial information from nonprofits, then misreporting financial
information in order to remain in compliance with regulations or to minimize tax liabilities is also
a form of disclosure management.
5.1. Political cost studies
The desire to avoid political costs, such as increased scrutiny from regulators, and the desire to
appear ‘‘worthy’’ to donors seem to create incentives to use more conservative accounting methods for
asset valuation. This is in line with Marudas (2004) finding that higher reported wealth had a negative
impact on private donations, at least among large arts and philanthropic nonprofits (although wealth
had a positive relationship on private donations to large educational institutions). Colleges and
universities can choose to account for their endowment assets using the cost method or the fair
market value (FMV) method. In a rising stock market, FMV will produce higher earnings and higher14 Nonprofits are exempt from tax on their program-related activities, but are taxed on business activities that are unrelated to
their mission. Private nonoperating foundations are also subject to taxes on undistributed income.
asset values, but a Peat (1985) study revealed that 78 percent of colleges and universities use the cost
method. Looking at schools with endowments of greater than $1 million, Chase and Coffman (1994)
observe that 36 out of 137 private institutions use FMV, while only three out of 33 public institutions
do, which is consistent with publicly funded schools wanting to minimize reported earnings and
wealth in order to avoid reductions in state funding. Private institutions with larger endowment
holdings are more likely to choose the FMV method and to report higher mean investment returns.
Chase and Coffman (1994) speculate that the size of an institution’s endowment may serve as a signal
to potential donors that others have recognized the institution’s value and that gifts will be managed
competently. This can explain why institutions with larger endowment funds are more likely to use
FMV.
In 1990, the FASB issued an exposure draft that would require museums to capitalize their
permanent artistic or historical collections. Due to strong negative reaction from the museum
community, FASB backed away from the requirement and instead made it optional. Christensen and
Mohr (1995) find a significant negative relationship between federal support and the decision to
capitalize the permanent collection. This is consistent with museum managers holding the belief that
reporting higher asset values might detract from the ‘‘worthiness’’ of the nonprofit and possibly
dampen public support. Size, frequently used as a proxy for political costs, is also negatively related to
capitalization in this study.
5.2. The healthcare regulatory environment: managing profits toward zero
There are a variety of reasons for nonprofit hospitals to avoid reporting losses. Hospital CEOs are
often evaluated on financial performance (Brickley & Van Horn, 2002), and the reporting of losses
might negatively impact managerial compensation, reputation, and career mobility. Furthermore,
many nonprofit hospitals finance capital expansion by issuing debt (Leone & Van Horn, 2005) and may
seek to avoid losses and to smooth earnings in order to reduce the cost of debt (Trueman & Titman,
1988).
There are also important reasons for nonprofit hospitals to minimize reported profits. The
existence of profits invites scrutiny from the IRS and state and local tax authorities. The U.S.
Comptroller General, Congress, the IRS, and a number of states and municipalities have recently begun
to question whether the difference between profit and nonprofit hospitals is large enough to justify
granting tax-exemption to the latter group (Kane, 2007). The reporting of profits may suggest that the
nonprofit hospital has not provided sufficient charitable services to the community (or that it is
overcharging for its services) and may cast doubt on its worthiness for tax exemption. Methodist
Hospital was sued by the Texas Attorney General soon after Modern Healthcare magazine named it the
third most profitable nonprofit hospital system in 1991 (Leone & Van Horn, 2005). In 2006, state
attorneys general in Illinois, Kansas, and Minnesota were looking into possible abuses by tax-exempt
hospitals, while other states were proposing legislation that would require minimum levels of charity
care (Kane, 2007).
Another reason to minimize the appearance of profitability is that third-party payers may use the
existence of profits as a reason to negotiate for price concessions from healthcare providers. There is a
stream of research that examines cost-shifting by hospitals to maximize reimbursements from third-
party payers or to avoid exceeding state-imposed revenue constraints. Eldenburg and Soderstrom
(1996) and Eldenburg and Kallapur (1997) find evidence that both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals
manage their patient mix, cost allocations, and budget estimates of patient volume and costs in order
to increase revenues and maximize cash flows.
If nonprofit and governmental hospitals operate as if subject to a profitability constraint, their
profits should show less variability over time than those of for-profit hospitals and less reaction to
changes in exogenous factors like Medicare reimbursement rates. A study by Hoerger (1991) strongly
supports both of those hypotheses. Variability is significantly less for nonprofit hospitals and even
smaller for government hospitals, which likely face a real budget constraint on actual profits. In
distributional analyses of nonprofit hospitals, Leone and Van Horn (2005) observe that the distribution
of operating income has much less variability (smaller standard deviation) than earnings before
discretionary accruals, suggesting that managers use discretionary accruals to moderate extreme
values of operating income.15 In a histogram of residual income scaled by total assets, Ballantine,
Forker, and Greenwood (2007) observe a significant discontinuity at zero, with a very large spike in the
interval from zero to 0.02 percent. In fact, 52 percent of all hospitals in their study are in the first two
intervals to the right of zero, consistent with managerial incentives to avoid losses and to minimize
profits.16
Studies using variations of the Jones model to examine accruals manipulation by nonprofit
healthcare institutions find evidence that managers of financially weak HMOs understate expense
accruals to minimize the political costs associated with failure to meet state-mandated minimum net
worth and cash reserve requirements while highly profitable HMOs attempt to reduce political
visibility by managing earnings downward using income-decreasing accruals (Mensah, Considine, &
Oakes, 1994) and that nonprofit hospital CEOs adjust discretionary accruals, particularly the third-
party adjustment account or allowance for bad debts, to decrease profits and losses (Ballantine et al.,
2007; Leone & Van Horn, 2005; Vansant, 2011).
In addition to accruals management, there is evidence that real activities are altered to manage
net income toward a benchmark of zero. In particular, expenditures for non-operating and non-
revenue-generating activities, as well as asset dispositions, appear to be managed to avoid losses but
minimize profits (Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee, & Soderstrom, 2011). Furthermore, that study finds that
firms with incentives to decrease (increase) expenditures in one year and no such incentive in the
following year are more likely to reverse the decrease (increase) in the following year, suggestive of
opportunism rather than managerial prudence. Charity care expenditures are found to be positively
associated with profits before charity care, suggesting that hospitals adjust the provision of charity
care to available resources and use it to minimize reported profits (Leone & Van Horn, 2005).
However, nonprofit hospitals that are already reporting adequate levels of charity care appear to be
less aggressive in managing earnings toward zero (Vansant, 2011). This result implies that hospital
management is less concerned about minimizing reported profits when adequate charity care is
reported.
Nonprofit hospitals are expected not only to provide services that are inherently unprofitable for
private enterprise but, in exchange for tax exemption, to use operating profits to provide free or
discounted healthcare to the indigent and uninsured. It is the provision of charity care more than the
absence of profits that justifies tax-exemption for nonprofit hospitals.17 In recent years, nonprofit
hospitals have come under closer government scrutiny and regulation regarding their charity care.
There are serious political costs for nonprofit hospitals that do not report sufficient charity care
(Missouri Foundation for Health, 2005).
In 1990, hospital accounting guidelines changed to require the amount of charity care to be
separately disclosed in a footnote rather than netted from gross income in aggregate with bad debts
and other write-offs (Eldenburg & Vines, 2004). Now that it is required that charity care be publicly
disclosed, managers have incentives to overstate charity care or understate bad debts. Comparing
amounts reported for charity care before and after this accounting change, Eldenburg and Vines (2004)
find that while overall levels of uncompensated care did not change, the hospitals experienced a
decline in bad debt expense as a percent of uncompensated care and as a percent of revenue. They also
find a strong negative association between changes in bad debt expense and changes in charity care,
which is highly suggestive of reclassification.1815 Leone and Van Horn (2005) also prepare a histogram of the distribution of one-year changes in reported operating income:
it is symmetrical, centered at zero, and displays no discontinuity below zero. This result is different from what Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) observed in the for-profit setting, suggesting that nonprofit managers do not face the same pressure to report
earnings growth.
16 As the authors point out, the inclusion of the entire population of NHS hospital trusts in their study rules out the possibility
of sample selection bias.
17 Technically, charity care includes all the costs and write-offs associated with services rendered to individuals determined
prior to service delivery to be unable to pay (and who are not eligible for public assistance); it does not include bad debts
(Missouri Foundation for Health, 2005).
18 Eldenburg and Vines (2004) are able to exploit a private database, from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration
(FAHCA), which allows each observation to serve as its own control. FAHCA requires annual budget and financial statement
information from all nonfederal hospitals in the state. These data have always included separate disclosure of charity care
expenses, but are not publicly available.
5.3. Misreporting to minimize taxes
There is a significant body of research regarding the taxation of tax-exempt nonprofits, and the tax
avoidance and evasion strategies that such taxation induces. Most of these studies center on the
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT). The fact that UBI is taxed at corporate rates would presumably
discourage nonprofits from venturing in that direction, unless the nonprofit can exploit existing
facilities and allocate some of the costs of exempt activities to the commercial activity. This tactic will
increase the apparent efficiency of the exempt activity and minimize taxes on the taxable activity.
Analytical modeling can be used to show that UBIT can effectively promote productive efficiency
(deterring nonprofits from engaging in such activities when there is a comparative disadvantage,
without deterring investment when there is a comparative advantage), but only if the costs deducted
to arrive at taxable income reflect the true economic costs of the activity (Sansing, 1998). If a nonprofit
is able to apply a cost allocation method that allocates enough of the organization’s common costs to
the unrelated activity to eliminate any taxable income, the expenses deducted will not necessarily
reflect the true incremental economic costs of the activity, and UBIT will fail to ensure productive
efficiency.
Much of the evidence that nonprofits over-allocate expenses to unrelated business activities is
circumstantial. For example, nearly 60 percent of nonprofits filing UBIT returns in 1991 report losses
from those activities (Cordes & Weisbrod, 1998). While it is reasonable to assume that nonprofits
engage in taxable activities to help fund their exempt activities, one must question a nonprofit’s
motivation for engaging in unprofitable business ventures. Nonprofit associations with unrelated
business activities are more profitable overall (measured by the surplus of total revenues over total
expenses) than those without such activities (Hofmann, 2007), yet most of those taxable activities
show no profits. These statistics are most easily explained as evidence of cost-shifting.
Is there more direct empirical evidence of cost-shifting to avoid UBIT? Lacking detailed information
regarding actual resource usage of taxable activities or exempt activities, Yetman (2001) develops a
prediction model based on the assumption that the expenses of the nonprofits’ various activities are
proportional to the revenues generated by each. A regression of the change in expenses on changes in
revenues yields variable expense ratios, which are used to predict the variable expenses that should be
allocated to taxable activities. Remaining (fixed) costs are allocated proportionally to revenues. The
difference between reported expenses and total predicted expenses for the taxable activities is taken
as an estimate of expense-shifting. Yetman finds significant results for educational nonprofits (23
percent of reported expenses are in excess of predicted) and for medical nonprofits (62 percent of
reported expenses are in excess of predicted) but not for charitable nonprofits. Hofmann (2007)
replicates Yetman’s (2001) study on a different population of nonprofits, trade and professional
associations, and finds 20–36 percent of reported expenses for unrelated activities are in excess of
predicted expenses. However, upon closer analysis of the prediction model, Hofmann questions its
validity and concludes that the variable cost ratios estimated by the model are likely overstated and
that cost-shifting is likely understated in both studies. Taking a different approach, Omer and Yetman
(2003) use a distributional analysis and find a notable discontinuity in the interval from negative one
percent to one percent: a statistically abnormal number of nonprofits report taxable income near zero.
Unrelated business activities, because they utilize existing facilities and personnel, often have no
marginal costs (Cordes & Weisbrod, 1998). From an economic perspective, the allocation of any
expenses to those activities is deemed cost-shifting. The previous empirical studies suggest that the
expenses reported on IRS Form 990-T might exceed the true incremental costs of the unrelated
business activity but do not necessarily prove that nonprofits are engaging in illegal tax evasion.
Treasury Regulation 1.512(a)-1 is rather lenient in its instructions as to appropriate allocations of
common costs to unrelated activities. Omer and Yetman (2007) attempt to find evidence of
misreporting that could be characterized as tax evasion. Using the tax returns collected for Yetman’s
2001 study, Omer and Yetman (2007) identify those firms that reported advertising, exploited, or
debt-financed activities.19 Tax laws strictly limit the deductible amounts of expenses for these three
types of taxable activities. They find that 19 percent of their observations over-report their taxable19 Exploited activities occur when a nonprofit exploits an intangible, for example its name or logo, for commercial purposes.
expenses in those areas by an average of 30 percent, thereby creating net operating losses (NOLs)
when the rules preclude a taxable income amount less than zero. Unfortunately, as Schmidt (2007)
points out, Omer and Yetman’s measure of misreporting may simply represent tax preparer error: the
instructions for the schedules accompanying IRS Form 990-T are not very clear. Furthermore, unless
the overstated expenses are carried forward to subsequent tax periods and used to offset taxable
income in the future, they do not really represent tax evasion but simply a reporting error, since the
firms are allowed to reduce their taxable income to zero.
UBIT is not the only tax levied on nonprofit organizations. Private foundations are subject to
several excise taxes; one in particular is designed to encourage annual distributions (Sansing &
Yetman, 2006). The Investment Income Tax (IIT) is an excise tax of two percent of net investment
income. The IIT rate can be reduced to one percent if the foundation distributes an amount equal
to or exceeding a threshold.20 Since current-year amounts are used in the calculation of the
threshold, foundations must estimate the minimum distribution required to qualify for the lower
tax rate. If a foundation is unable or unwilling to distribute sufficient cash in a given year or finds
itself short of the threshold at the end of the year, it may increase qualifying distributions by
allocating higher amounts of general and administrative expenses to qualifying distributions, or it
may set aside amounts from future distributions to be used toward meeting current minimums.21
Thus, foundation managers have the flexibility to allocate across expense categories and across
time. Yoder et al. (2011) examine a balanced panel of 1974 private foundations over a 12-year
period and find evidence that foundations make allocations from investment expenses to
qualifying distributions and recognize future qualifying distributions in the current year to just
qualify for the 1 percent IIT.
6. Research involving consequences and remedies
Throughout the nonprofit disclosure management literature, researchers underscore the
potential negative consequences of inaccurate financial reporting. If donors use the program ratio
to help make allocation decisions, then distortions in that ratio will result in a misallocation of
resources among nonprofits. This conclusion assumes, however, that donors actually use accounting
information (which is not the same as saying that donations are correlated with program ratios) and
that they are unable to detect disclosure management or to make adjustments for it. A number of
studies focus on the reaction of donors (or donations) to performance ratios. While the ability to
avoid UBIT and IIT by the use of cost allocations undermines the government’s objectives for those
taxes, there is little evidence as to the consequences this might have on the federal budget or the
overall economy.
6.1. Do donors use accounting information when making donation decisions?
In an experiment using business students as subjects (and subject to all the limitations inherent in
such studies), Buchheit and Parsons (2006) find that fewer than half the participants who had made a
decision to donate were willing to view comparative financial information to ensure their donation
was going to the most efficient anonymous charity. Of those who chose to view the financial
summaries, however, 89 percent made their donation to the charity with the highest program ratio.
In a field experiment involving a fundraising appeal for an actual local charity, the probability of
making a donation was positively related to receiving accounting information but only for donors
who had previously given to the organization (Parsons, 2007). In a follow-up lab experiment,
students were asked to evaluate the usefulness of various disclosures. Prospective donors found
fundraising appeals more informative if they included accounting or service effort and
accomplishment disclosures.20 See IRC 4940(c) and associated Treasury Regulation.
21 For tax purposes, general and administrative expenses are allocated between investment expense and qualifying
distributions.
6.2. Are users (donors) misled by financial disclosure management?
Khumawala et al. (2005) utilize a controlled experiment in which participants are asked to allocate
$25,000 between two competing medical research charities. They are given financial statements of
both charities as well typical fundraising materials. Both charities disclose a $2 million joint
advertising/public education campaign. ‘‘Organization Q’’ inappropriately classifies the bulk of the
joint costs as program services and consequently has a higher program ratio. If the allocations are
undone and the joint costs are reclassified as fundraising, ‘‘Organization P’’ actually has the higher
program ratio. Although all amounts and allocations are disclosed, the participant-donors allocate
more money more frequently to Organization Q. Experienced donors and preparers are actually more
likely to accept the reported joint cost allocations than the novice donors among the participants.22
When asked about the usefulness of various disclosures, participants seldom indicate that the joint
cost allocation footnote is influential to the donation decision.
These studies suggest that small donors, at least, do not use accounting information effectively.
Although donors say they value accounting information, they do not appear to be willing to expend
much time or effort to obtain it. When they consider accounting information, both experienced and
inexperienced donors seem to focus on the program ratio, taking the reported numbers at face value.
This suggests that small donors who use accounting information can be misled by misreported
numbers and may not allocate their donations to the most efficient charities.23
Other studies lead to a slightly more optimistic view of the users of nonprofit accounting
information. Yetman and Yetman (2013) estimate that the average donor discounts the program ratio
by 40 percent when zero fundraising expenses are reported, an obvious red flag for disclosure
management. They also observe that sophisticated donors (those who make restricted donations)
have more incentive or ability to recognize low reporting quality. Another important finding of their
study is that donor reaction to potential accounting manipulation (as measured by zero fundraising
expenses) increased markedly after 1998, when IRS Form 990 became readily accessible to donors on
the GuideStar website. Overall, the market seems to reward nonprofits that have higher quality
accounting disclosures on IRS Form 990. Firms that pay professional accounting fees or undergo a
single audit, those receiving support indirectly through feeder agencies like the United Way, and firms
checking the box to indicate compliance with SOP 98-2 all receive larger donations, ceteris paribus
(Thornton & Belski, 2010).
6.3. What can be done to limit harmful disclosure management?
The research reviewed in this paper has revealed a number of factors that appear to mitigate
financial disclosure management: use of accrual accounting or professional outside accountants
(Keating et al., 2008; Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Thornton & Belski, 2010), professional management
(Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Tinkelman, 1999), and larger size (Tinkelman, 1999). These findings could
be interpreted to suggest that some of what has been identified as disclosure management is actually a
result of lack of accounting expertise, not intentional misreporting. On the other hand, a more complex
donor pool (receipt of restricted donations) (Keating et al., 2008; Yetman & Yetman, 2013), greater
external monitoring (Keating et al., 2008; Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Thornton & Belski, 2010),
external audits (Grein & Tate, 2011; Thornton & Belski, 2010), and tighter regulation (enactment of
SOP 98-2) (Jones & Roberts, 2006) have all been shown to be negatively associated with disclosure
management, suggesting that even intentional misreporting can be reduced by increased regulation
and oversight. Yetman and Yetman (2011) find that a number of governance variables are positively
associated with more accurate reporting. They conclude that measures such as requiring audits,
increasing state regulation and enforcement, and requiring SOX-type provisions such as audit22 Before SOP 98-2 became effective, Tinkelman (1998) found evidence that experienced donors were skeptical of joint cost
allocations, and that unsophisticated donors were more likely to accept reported amounts as given.
23 Less than one percent of nonprofits report joint costs, however, so it is not clear that the results of Tinkelman (1998) or
Khumawala et al. (2005) are generalizable to other nonprofits or to other types of misreporting.
committees, written policies, and a greater number of independent board members can improve the
accuracy of Form 990.
Table 2 summarizes the papers discussed in Sections 4–6, showing for each paper the focus of the
study, sources and time period for the data, sample size, statistical methodology, financial disclosure
variable(s) of interest, and a brief summary of the results.
7. Summary and suggestions for future research
When all is said and done, what is really known about disclosure management in the nonprofit
sector? There are tentative answers to at least a few basic questions. Why would nonprofits engage in
earnings management? At the most fundamental level, nonprofit managers may attempt to mislead
their board of trustees regarding how well they have fulfilled their stewardship function in order to
protect their position or reputation or to increase their compensation. Managers may attempt to
mislead donors, rating agencies, grantors, and the general public about how efficiently and effectively
they are accomplishing their organization’s philanthropic mission, or about how worthy the
organization is, in order to garner more donations or grants. Nonprofit managers may attempt to
mislead the IRS regarding their organization’s qualification for tax-exempt status or liability for
unrelated business income tax and to mislead state regulatory agencies to justify the right of the
organization operate as a nonprofit and to solicit funds in the state.
How do nonprofits manage their financial disclosures? The existing literature identifies some
management of real transactions—curtailing spending on administrative expenses, for example—and
strategic accounting choices related to asset valuation, but for charities the primary means of
accomplishing financial disclosure management seems to be the misclassification of costs and the
over- or under-allocation of joint costs to programs or fundraising. Nonprofits are most likely to over-
report amounts spent on programs or under-report amounts spent on fundraising in order to increase
the program ratio (program expenses as a percentage of total expenses) or decrease the fundraising
ratio (fundraising expenses as a percentage of donations received). In nonprofit hospitals, there is
evidence of the management of discretionary accruals, disclosure management in the reporting of
charity care, and managerial choices related to non-operating expenditures and asset dispositions.
How prevalent is disclosure management in the nonprofit sector? Some studies suggest it is
widespread, while others downplay its significance. Certain factors are positively associated with
financial disclosure management, or at least with the likelihood of financial disclosure management:
small size, greater sensitivity of donations or managerial compensation to the program ratio, and
financial distress (higher debt levels). What are the consequences of such disclosure management? Some
studies suggest that users are misled and resources misallocated, while others conclude that many
users are sophisticated enough to undo the managed numbers. One point that is frequently overlooked
is the fact that different users have access to different financial information. IRS Form 990 is the
primary public disclosure, and because of its ready availability is the most likely source of information
for small donors. However, some evidence suggests that small donors do not utilize financial
information in making donation decisions, so little harm is done if Form 990 numbers are
manipulated. Major donors, on the other hand, are likely to be more sophisticated and to be in a
position to request and receive audited financial statements. If the audited statements have been
affected by financial disclosure management, the potential for misallocation of resources is much
greater. Unfortunately, most financial disclosure management research uses Form 990 data.
Conclusions about the frequency, severity, and negative consequences of disclosure management are
possibly overstated by those studies.
What can be done to prevent or at least discourage disclosure management? Research has revealed a
number of factors that appear to mitigate financial disclosure management, most of them obvious:
larger size, older age, use of accrual accounting or professional outside accountants, undergoing an
audit, use of professional management, greater external monitoring and tighter regulation (for
example, enactment of SOP 98-2). Better accounting standards, particularly in the area of appropriate
cost allocations, and more regulation aimed at improving reporting quality would appear to go a long
way toward minimizing the opportunities for disclosure management. Rather than waiting for states
or the IRS to enact stricter reporting requirements, donors have the power to take a governance role
and demand greater nonprofit accountability. One way to accomplish this is to impose restrictions on
donations and require the organization to report regarding the use of the funds.
There are a number of limitations inherent in the research reviewed in this paper, many of which
have already been discussed. Care must be taken when drawing conclusions from what one thinks the
research has revealed; there is potentially a great deal of endogeneity or simultaneity among the
variables entering the various equations. For example, it has been established that donations are
positively correlated with program ratios. However, is this because donors consider the program ratio
before deciding to whom or how much to donate, or is it because nonprofits with superior
management and fundraising teams are able to pull in more money and spend it more efficiently?
Among the papers reviewed, the reader will have noticed that some researchers use donations as the
dependent variable and interpret a positive coefficient on the program ratio as evidence that donors
use it in making donation decisions, while others use the program ratio as the dependent variable and
interpret the positive coefficient on donations as an indication that reliance on donations creates
incentives to inflate the program ratio. It is not certain which is the direction of causation, or if both
variables are jointly (or separately) determined by other factors.
Individually and collectively, the results of these studies have important implications for
accounting academics and practitioners as well as for the public. Researchers must deal with the
possibility that reported numbers may not be accurate representations and should consider the
likelihood of accounting manipulation and any bias it might introduce into a data set. Auditors may
need to develop more sophisticated guidelines for judging the reasonableness of nonprofit cost
classifications and allocations. Donors and potential donors must be wary of financial reports that
appear too good to be true (zero fundraising costs) or that include allocations of joint costs to
programs. Policymakers must consider the potential misallocation of resources that results when
donors are misled by inflated efficiency ratios. State and federal regulators should consider imposing
requirements that will improve the quality of nonprofit financial reporting (providing the benefits
exceed the costs). Donors should consider the role they can play in nonprofit governance and
accountability.
This review of research to date has perhaps raised more questions than it has answered. The topic
has not been exhausted, and the research is far from mature. A number of areas merit further inquiry.
First and foremost, perhaps, is the issue of methodology. Data and model specification problems raise
questions about the validity or generalizability of many of the studies. Can better models be designed
to predict nonprofit revenues/expenses in order to estimate financial disclosure management? Future
research will also be more compelling if it is based on the same data that decision-makers are most
likely to use. Some research needs to be taken to the next level. For example, there is ample evidence
that nonprofits likely manage the expenses reported on their UBIT returns; however, research to date
cannot establish whether this constitutes illegal tax evasion, accounting incompetency, or smart tax
planning. Future research might examine how the program ratio interacts with changes in unrelated
business revenue or whether UBIT misreporting is associated with the program ratio or with the
proportion of revenue received through donations.
Additional areas also remain to be examined. The issue of disclosure management related to
revenues is virtually unexplored: restricted versus unrestricted, net revenues versus gross revenues,
timing issues, etc. Another angle would be differences in motivation for disclosure management based
on differences in sources of revenue: donations versus program services, for example, or public
support versus grants from foundations or feeder agencies. There has been little research regarding
potential disclosure management relating to asset or liability recognition and valuation. What about
disclosure management related to the use of debt? It would be interesting to compare Leone and Van
Horn’s (2005) study using nonprofit hospitals that issue public debt to a group of nonprofit hospitals
without any public debt to see how the presence/absence of public debt affects the incentives and
opportunities for disclosure management.
While the donations market motivation for disclosure management has been heavily researched,
much less work has been done regarding the incentives to misreport amounts that might affect
managerial compensation or the cost of debt. Studies regarding misreporting to avoid political costs
have focused on tax and regulator consequences. Have other potential motivations for financial
disclosure management been overlooked? One area that might prove interesting is the impact of
financial reporting on the nonprofit’s public image or reputation as portrayed in the media. Nonprofit
managers are conscious of the fact that having financial reports available to the donating public means
that information regarding executive compensation, fundraising costs, and other potentially
embarrassing items is open to media scrutiny. In the age of WikiLeaks, Twitter, and viral videos, is
it possible that nonprofits manage financial information to avoid negative media attention?
On a more theoretical level, perhaps it would be enlightening to compare disclosure management
across different types of nonprofits. Gordon and Khumawala (1999) suggest that the demand for and
use of financial statement information by donors varies among types of nonprofits and donors. They
end their paper with a series of research proposals positing that the demand for financial reporting is
greatest in situations where the donor (1) has little contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of the gift,
(2) has little involvement with the recipient organization, (3) receives little tangible or intangible
reward for giving, (4) is choosing from among competing organizations, or (5) makes large and
frequent donations. Non-charitable nonprofits such as social clubs, homeowners associations, and
trade and professional associations are representative of situations where the donors or members are
likely to be more involved with the organization or to receive tangible goods and services from the
organization, and thus would have less need for financial information (Keating & Frumkin, 2003).24
Future research could examine whether financial disclosure management is less prevalent among
exempt membership organizations or in other situations where there is less stakeholder interest in
financial statements and thus less incentive to manipulate financial statement amounts. Replicating a
study on a population that lacks the same motivations for disclosure management can serve to
validate (or not) the original study.
Last, there are questions relating to audits and other means of reducing disclosure management
and improving reporting quality. What kind of guidelines, if any, do auditors use in judging the
reasonableness of nonprofit cost classifications and joint cost allocations? How do auditors apply the
three criteria of SOP 98-2 in testing the appropriateness of joint cost allocations? Can better cost-
allocation guidelines be developed, and would that curtail disclosure management related to cost
allocations? What specific governance mechanisms are most effective at improving reporting quality?
Can SOX-type provisions be applied to nonprofits? The IRS has recently revised Form 990 and is now
collecting more variables, including a section on governance, management, and disclosure. As more
data becomes available, more sophisticated analyses become possible. Many of these questions can
also be addressed through experimental studies. Financial disclosure management in the nonprofit
sector remains a fruitful area of inquiry for accounting researchers.
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